

## Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 00680

GENEVA FOR CCD & CTB DELS

E.O. 11652:GDS  
TAGS: PARM, IO  
SUBJECT: UNSSOD PREPCOM IV: WRAP-UP

1. SUMMARY: FOLLOWING IS USDEL ASSESSMENT OF PREPCOM IV, PENULTIMATE MEETING OF THE PREPCOM BEFORE THE MAY 23-JUNE 28 SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT. THIS MESSAGE DESCRIBES THE STATE OF WORK AT THE END OF THE SESSION AND THE MANDATE FOR PREPCOM V, COMMENTS ON THE PROGRAM OF ACTION AND MACHINERY SECTIONS OF THE DRAFTING EXERCISE, AND INDICATES THE EXPECTATIONS OF VARIOUS GROUPS AND DELEGATIONS REGARDING THE US ROLE BOTH AT PREPCOM V AND THE SPECIAL SESSION. END SUMMARY

2. STATE OF WORK. PREPCOM IV WAS THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE SESSION AFTER THREE PRELIMINARY ROUNDS ON ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES. ITS MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT WAS TO REDUCE THE MANY WORKING TEXTS INTRODUCED BY GROUPS OR SINGLE DELEGATIONS INTO A VERY LENGTHY AND HEAVILY BRACKETED  
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SINGLE COMPOSITE WORKING TEXT. THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN ISSUED BY THE UN SECRETARIAT AS A CONFERENCE ROOM PAPER (NUMBER 15, DATED FEBRUARY 24, 1978) RATHER THAN A UN DOCUMENT, AND HAS BEEN DISTRIBUTED ONLY TO PARTICIPATING DELEGATIONS, IN ORDER TO UNDERSCORE THE FACT THAT IT IS INDEED ONLY A WORKING TEXT PRODUCED BY SUBDRAFTING GROUPS. NO DELEGATION OR

GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO ANY PART OF IT, AND THE TEXT IN ITS ENTIRETY WILL CONSTITUTE THE DOCUMENTARY BASIS FOR THE WORK OF THE FINAL SESSION OF THE PREPCOM. COPIES OF THIS CONFERENCE ROOM PAPER ARE BEING HAND CARRIED TO IO/UNP AND ACDA/MA AND WILL POUCHED TO OTHER ADDRESSEES.

3. DYNAMICS OF PREPCOM IV. IN GENERAL, THE WORK OF PREPCOM IV WAS THAT OF COMPILATION AND TENTATIVE STRUCTURING/ORGANIZATION OF THE DRAFT DOCUMENTS RATHER THAN NEGOTIATION. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TRUE FOR THE LATTER AND MOST SUBSTANTIVE SECTIONS -- I.E. THE PROGRAM OF ACTION AND THE MACHINERY. SEVERAL FACTORS EXPLAIN THIS. AS NOTED ABOVE, THIS WAS THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE SESSION; EVERYONE WAS AWARE THAT THE SPECIAL SESSION STILL THREE MONTHS AWAY WOULD BE ADDRESSING THE TOUGHEST ISSUE AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL; MANY DELEGATIONS HAD JUST TABLED THEIR POSITIONS IN WORKING PAPERS; THE LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION VARIED FROM JUNIOR AND MIDDLE LEVEL UN DELEGATES TO CCD AMBASSADORS AND IN A FEW CASES UN PERMREPS; AND THE MAJOR GROUPINGS WERE STILL IN THE PROCESS OF WORKING OUT THEIR POSITIONS ON MANY ISSUES. THE NET RESULT WAS THAT MOST OF THE WORK OF PREPCOM IV CONSISTED OF PUTTING MAXIMUM OR PREFERRED POSITIONS INTO THE DRAFT DOCUMENTS RATHER THAN SEEK-CONFIDENTIAL

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ING TO BRIDGE OR RECONCILE THEM. THIS EXTENDED EVEN TO NON-SUBSTANTIVE AND QUASI SEMANTIC DISTINCTIONS.

4. MANDATE FOR PREPCOM V. IN VIEW OF THIS SITUATION, IN WHICH DELEGATIONS ARE NOW FACED WITH A BULKY, HEAVILY BRACKETED AND IN SOME PLACES HARD TO UNDERSTAND COMPOSITE TEXT, IT WAS DECIDED AT THE LAST MEETING OF PREPCOM IV TO START PREPCOM V FOUR DAYS EARLIER THAN PREVIOUSLY PLANNED TO ALLOW MORE TIME FOR THE NEXT STAGE OF NEGOTIATION. PREPCOM V WILL BE FROM APRIL 4 -21. THE CHAIRMAN HAS URGED THAT DELEGATIONS BE REPRESENTED "AT THE NEGOTIATING LEVEL" -- I. E., THAT PARTICIPANTS BE EMPOWERED TO ACTUALLY NEGOTIATE, MAKE CONCESSIONS AND AGREE TO COMPROMISES OR NEW FORMULATIONS RATHER THAN SIMPLY INSTRUCTED TO STICK TO RIGID POSITIONS. WHILE IT IS GENERALLY RECOGNIZED THAT ON KEY ISSUES IN BOTH THE PROGRAM OF ACTION, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, AND IN THE MACHINERY SECTION, THE FINAL DECISIONS IN ALL LIKELIHOOD WILL BE TAKEN AT THE SPECIAL SESSION ITSELF, THE OBJECTIVE FOR PREPCOM V IS TO SIMPLIFY THE TEXT AS MUCH AS

POSSIBLE BY REMOVING THE BRACKETS IN THE OBVIOUSLY  
DUPLICATIVE SECTIONS AND INsofar AS POSSIBLE RE-  
CONCILING POSITIONS ON OTHER MATTERS.

5. PREPCOM V WILL BE CHARGED WITH DRAFTING THE REPORT  
OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE TO THE SPECIAL SESSION  
TRANSMITTING THE DRAFT FINAL DOCUMENTS TO THE SSOD  
FOR ITS CONSIDERATION. IT WILL ALSO BE ASKED TO TAKE  
A DECISION ON NGO PARTICIPATION AT THE SPECIAL SESSION.  
PENDING THIS DECISION, THE PREPCOM CHAIRMAN HAS ASKED  
THE NGO GROUPS MEETING IN GENEVA TO WORK OUT WHICH OF  
THEM WOULD ADDRESS THE SPECIAL SESSION IN A ONE DAY  
MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE.

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6. PROGRAM OF ACTION. WHILE THERE WAS VIRTUALLY NO  
NEGOTIATION IN THIS DRAFTING GROUP, THE DISCUSSION  
ABOUT THE PROGRAM OF ACTION AT PREPCOM IV UNDERSCORED  
THE SHARPLY DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS OF THE NON-ALIGNED,  
THE WESTERN AND THE EASTERN GROUPS ON THE PURPOSES  
AND OBJECTIVES OF THE SPECIAL SESSION. CLEARLY, THE  
MOST IMPORTANT AND DIFFICULT ISSUES IN THE PROGRAM OF  
ACTION HAVE TO DO WITH NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. THE NON-  
ALIGNED GROUP WANTS THE SSOD TO PRODUCE, IN THE WORDS  
OF THE INDIA- UN PERMREP, "A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH" TOWARDS  
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT BY HAVING THE MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS  
-- AND PARTICULARLY THE US AND THE USSR -- COMMIT THEM-  
SELVES TO A HIGHLY DETAILED AND SPECIFIC SERIES OF

SWEEPING MEASURES (FREEZING OF QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS; CESSATION OF R AND D FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS; CESSATION OF PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES; BALANCED REDUCTION OF STOCKPILES) AND LEGALLY BINDING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS RE NON USE AGAINST NON NUCLEAR  
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WEAPONS STATES; NO FIRST USE; OBLIGATIONS TO NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES AND SO ON. THE WEST HAS PUT FORWARD A BROAD GENERAL FORMULATION, INDICATING THE NEED TO SEEK AGREEMENTS ON HALTING THE BUILDUP OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS AND BEGINNING THEIR REDUCTION, BUT EMPHASIZING THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACTUALLY NEGOTIATING AND/OR PREJUDGING THE OUTCOME OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH ACCEPTANCE OF SPECIFIC NON-ALIGNED PROPOSALS IN THE SSOD. THE SOVIETS HAVE PUT FORWARD WELL-KNOWN POSITIONS ON CESSATION OF PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BAN ON NEUTRON WEAPONS, BAN ON SHIPS CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CERTAIN REGIONS, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON NON-USE OF FORCE, AND MEASURES TO PREVENT OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR. THE POLES HAVE PROPOSED THE NEED FOR COMPLETE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE SEABED.

7. THE DIFFICULTY OF NEGOTIATING THE PROGRAM OF ACTION AT THE FIFTH PREPCOM IS TWOFOLD: (A) THE SPECIFIC NON-ALIGNED PROPOSALS ARE UNACCEPTABLE BOTH TO WEST AND EAST (B) ON THE OTHER HAND THE BROAD GENERALIZED APPROACH PROPOSED BY THE WEST IS PERCEIVED BY THE NON-ALIGNED AS VITIATING THE PROGRAM OF ACTION -- AND HENCE THE SPECIAL SESSION -- OF SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS. THEY BELIEVE THAT OUR APPROACH MEANS THAT THE MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS ARE UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO MAKE MEANINGFUL NEW COMMITMENTS OR UNDERTAKE ADEQUATE FURTHER STEPS TOWARDS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. WHILE RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SALT AND CTB NEGOTIATIONS, THEY HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THESE ARE NOT VIEWED BY THEM AS ENOUGH, AND THAT THE PROGRAM OF ACTION MUST GO FURTHER.

8. THIS PERCEPTION OF WESTERN AND EASTERN POSITIONS  
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ON NUCLEAR ISSUES HAS ALSO AFFECTED THE NON-ALIGNED ATTITUDE TO THE ISSUES OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS LIMITATIONS

TATIONS GENERALLY AND RESTRAINTS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS IN PARTICULAR. THE NON-ALIGNED HAVE ONLY BEEN GRADUALLY WILLING TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE RELATIONSHIP OF ACTION IN THE CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS FIELD TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT EVEN AS IT RELATED TO THE MAJOR POWERS. BUT WITH RESPECT TO ARMS TRANSFER RESTRAINTS, THEY WANT IT TO HIGHLIGHT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MAJOR SUPPLIERS TO CURB THEIR OWN BUILDUP AND THEY WANT TO ASSURE THAT THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS GENERALLY HAS LOWER PRIORITY THAN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. THUS THEY REFER TO THE GRADUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS "IN THE CONTEXT OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT". IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS, NON-ALIGNED DELS HAVE MADE CLEAR THEIR CONCERN THAT THE WEST IS PUSHING HARD ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS BUT IS UNWILLING TO DO ANYTHING WHICH THEY REGARD AS MEANINGFUL OR SUFFICIENT TOWARDS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. USDELS EFFORTS TO PUSH ACCEPTANCE OF ARGUMENTS FOR ARMS TRANSFER RESTRAINTS MAY HAVE MADE A VERY SLIGHT DENT IN THEIR OPPOSITION BUT NOT TO THE POINT WHERE THEY ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT EFFORTS TO ENDORSE SUCH RESTRAINT ACTIVITIES AS OTHER THAN DIVERSIONARY. IN THE LONG RUN, ANY POSSIBILITY OF SUCH ACCEPTANCE WILL BE HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON MOOD GENERATED BY SSOD ACTIONS OF MAJOR POWERS.

9. THE DISCUSSION ON NON-PROLIFERATION ALBEIT BRIEF HIGHLIGHTED THE WELL-KNOWN DICHOTOMY FROM THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE AND PREVIOUS UNGAS BETWEEN NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES OF THE NES AND THE INDUSTRIALIZED STATES ON ONE HAND AND THE NON-ALIGNED DESIRE TO MAXIMIZE ACCESS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO NUCLEAR

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ENERGY, MATERIALS AND TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. IT HAS ALSO UNDERSCORED THE CONTINUING RESENTMENT OF MANY THRESHHOLD STATES AT WHAT THEY REGARD AS THE DISCRIMINATORY NATURE OF THE NPT, AND THE NEED FOR THE MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS TO MEET THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLES IV AND VI. THE WEST AND EAST IN TURN HAVE PUT FORWARD THEIR VIEWS ON THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME THROUGH A SERIES OF SPECIFIC ADDITIONAL MEASURES. THE NON-ALIGNED BELIEVE THESE TEND TO BLOCK THEIR ACCESS TO NUCLEAR ENERGY, AND UNDER THE GUISE OF NON-PROLIFERATION CONTRIBUTE TO THE PERPETUATION OF THE NORTH/SOUTH GAP. SOME OF THE DIFFERENCES ARE CLEARLY SUBSTANTIVE BUT SOME ARE THE "THEOLOGY" OF LANGUAGE.

10. MACHINERY. THIS IS CLEARLY AN AREA OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO ALL DELEGATIONS AND WAS THE SUBJECT OF EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION DURING PREPCOM IV. THERE IS STRONG PRESSURE FROM THE NON-ALIGNED, THE FRENCH AND MANY OF OUR ALLIES FOR CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENTIAL

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NEGOTIATING MACHINERY. THE CENTRAL ISSUE IS THE MODIFICATION/AND OR REPLACEMENT OF THE CCD. GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO CONCEDE ON THE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP IF A VIABLE NEGOTIATING FORUM IS RETAINED, AND THE GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT ANY NEGOTIATING FORUM SHOULD OPERATE BY CONSENSUS, THE KEY QUESTION WILL BE WHETHER FRENCH INSISTENCE THAT THIS FORUM BE A PRODUCT OF UN ACTION (AS THE CCD IS NOT) CAN BE MADE COMPATIBLE WITH CURRENT US AND SOVIET THINKING ON THIS TOPIC. USDEL BELIEVES CAREFUL FURTHER THOUGH SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THIS POINT. FROM THOSE ALLIES WHO ARE OUTSIDERS TRYING TO GET INTO CCD IN SOME FASHION (E.G., AUSTRALIA, NORWAY, TURKEY) WE CAN EXPECT CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE IN THE WEEKS AHEAD.

11. ANOTHER MAJOR ISSUE FACING US IS THE NON-ALIGNED/ INDIAN PROPOSAL FOR A NEW UN DELIBERATIVE BODY TO DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATING PROGRAM BY THE 35TH UNGA IN 1980. WE WILL HAVE TO EXPLORE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS FURTHER INCLUDING INDIAN INTERESTS, HOW IMPORTANT THIS IS TO THE NON-ALIGNED IF THE CCD IS CHANGED (I.E., IS THIS PROPOSAL A BARGAINING CHIP?) AND HOW IT RELATES

TO THE FRENCH PROPOSALS TO HAVE THE UN FIRST COMMITTEE FUNCTION AS THE UN DISARMAMENT COMMISSION. THE NON-ALIGNED ALSO SEEM UNCLEAR AS TO WHETHER THEIR PROPOSED NEW BODY IS TO BE TEMPORARY -- ONLY UNTIL 1980 -- OR PERMANENT. AS REGARDS PROPOSALS FOR STRENGTHENING THE UN CENTER FOR DISARMAMENT, THESE SEEM TO US AS HARD TO OBJECT TO IN PRINCIPLE, PARTICULARLY SINCE SOME OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS COME FROM WEST, BUT CLEARLY CARRY FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS.

12. EXPECTATIONS. AT THIS STAGE PROSPECTS FOR OBTAIN-  
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ING A CONSENSUS AT THE SPECIAL SESSION ARE VERY UNCERTAIN. A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS, BOTH IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STATEMENTS, HAVE BEEN PESSIMISTIC IN EVALUATING PROSPECTS FOR BRIDGING DIFFERENT APPROACHES OF THE THREE MAJOR GROUPINGS NOT ONLY TO THE SPECIAL SESSION BUT TO THE FUTURE COURSE OF DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS. NEVERTHELESS AT CONCLUSION OF PREPCOM IV NON-ALIGNED WERE UNCERTAIN AS TO WHETHER TO FEEL PESSIMISTIC OR SLIGHTLY OPTIMISTIC. IN OUR JUDGMENT, THE KEY STATES WHICH CAN EITHER ENCOURAGE CONTINUING RIGIDITY OR ACCOMMODATION IN THE NON-ALIGNED CAMP ARE INDIA AND YUGOSLAVIA. THEIR MAIN OBJECTIVE IS THAT THE SPECIAL SESSION SHOULD PRODUCE CONCRETE ACTIONS AND DECISIONS BY THE SOVIET UNION AND OURSELVES REGARDING (A) STEPS BEYOND SALT II TOWARDS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND (B) ASSURANCES ON THE NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IF WE CAN RESPOND IN THESE TWO CRITICAL AREAS, DEL BELIEVES THAT THE OTHER SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES REFLECTED IN THE BRACKETED TEXT CAN BE REMOVED SO AS TO AT LEAST ENVISAGE THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME GENERAL CONSENSUS ON THE PROGRAM OF ACTION TO EMERGE. INDIAN PERMREP JAIPAL IN HIS CLOSING STATEMENT TO PREPCOM IV MADE THIS POINT IN AN ELOQUENT APPEAL TO THE SOVIETS AND OURSELVES TO HOLD DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN NOW AND THE SPECIAL SESSION TO DEVELOP OUR OWN NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF ACTION FOR PRESENTATION TO THE SSOD TAKING INTO ACCOUNT NON-ALIGNED "ASPIRATIONS".

13. THE NON-ALIGNED AND MOST OF OUR ALLIES ALSO ARE LOOKING TO THE SOVIETS AND OURSELVES TO AGREE TO CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATING MACHINERY, FIRST AND FOREMOST AS REGARDS THE CCD INCLUDING THE

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CO-CHAIRMANSHIP ISSUE, IN ORDER TO FACILITATE FRENCH  
PARTICIPATION AND ALLOW OTHER STATES TO HAVE GREATER  
INVOLVEMENT IN THE SUBSTANCE OF DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS.

14. AS REGARDS BOTH THE PROGRAM OF ACTION  
AND MACHINERY, THE NON-ALIGNED AND MANY OF OUR ALLIES  
BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS AND TO LESSER EXTENT US ARE  
TAKING A DAMAGE LIMITING ATTITUDE. NON-ALIGNED ARE  
FULLY AWARE OF GREATER US FLEXIBILITY ON MACHINERY  
ISSUES. THEY WILL PROBABLY EXPECT SOME PUBLIC EVIDENCE  
OF THIS PRIOR TO SSOD. OUR ALLIES, WHILE CLEARLY  
WANTING TO PRESERVE OUR COMMON SECURITY, ALSO WANT TO  
BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY NO LESS THAN THE NON-  
ALIGNED ARE COMMITTED TO INTENSIFIED ARMS CONTROL AND  
DISARMAMENT EFFORTS AND GREATER DEMOCRATIZATION OF  
ITS ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES. YOUNG

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